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I. INTRODUCTION
The Union’s financial interests are harmed by irregularities in the funds’ 
management of the EU budget at a threatening high rate. This misman-
agement might result either from fraudulent behaviour or from other ir-
regularities. The need to combat these harmful behaviours, following the 
financial scandal that led to the resignation of the Santer commission1, led 
to the establishment of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)2. OLAF’s 
legal nature is hybrid, in the sense that it constitutes, on the one hand, an in-
dependent authority; while on the other hand, it forms an executing branch 
(Service Directorate General) of the European Commission3. 
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1.  V. PUJAS, The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF): A European policy to fight against 
economic and financial fraud, Journal of European Public Policy, 2003, p. 792; J.A. VAR-
VAELE, Towards an independent European agency to fight fraud and corruption in the 
EU?, European Journal of Crime, Criminal law and criminal Justice, 1999, pp. 331-346; 
P. CRAIG, The fall and renewal of the Commission: Accountability, contract and admin-
istrative organization, ELJ, 2000, pp. 981-116. See Commission Decision 1999/352/EC, 
ECSC, Euratom of 28 April 1999 establishing OLAF.
2.  From its French name: Office de Lutte Anti-Fraude.
3.  Although OLAF belongs administratively to the Commission, it enjoys full operational 
independence. OLAF’s Director-General has a right of action against the Commission 
before the CJEU, for every measure the Commission adopts that might jeopardise this 
independence. 
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OLAF’s mission is threefold. It consists in a) protecting the financial inter-
ests of the European Union by investigating fraud and other illegal activi-
ties, b) detecting and investigating serious matters relating to the discharge 
of professional duties by staff of the EU institutions that could result in 
disciplinary or criminal proceedings and c) supporting in general the EU 
in the development and implementation of anti-fraud legislation and poli-
cies4.
While OLAF is not a prosecuting authority, it is empowered to conduct 
internal investigations, i.e. inside any European institution or body funded 
by the EU budget, and external investigations, i.e. at national level, wher-
ever and whenever the EU budget is at stake. For this purposes, OLAF may 
conduct on-the-spot checks and inspections on the premises of economic 
operators, in close cooperation with the member state at issue. OLAF may 
acquire access to confidential information, to photocopy documents, to in-
vite employees to testify and in general, to conduct all the investigatory 
acts, similar to those that national authorities are allowed to conduct5.
On completion of an investigation carried out by OLAF, the latter com-
pletes a report, under the authority of the Director, containing, in particular, 
the findings of the investigation, including the recommendations of the 
Director on the action that should be taken. The report that follows the 
internal investigation and the related documents is then sent to the institu-
tion, body, office or agency concerned, which is responsible to take, where 
appropriate, any disciplinary or legal actions based on the results and rec-
ommendations of the investigation.
The perfectly legitimate goal of the investigation of fraudulent behaviours 
might, however, undermine the protection of human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms. According to Art. 2 TEU, “the Union is founded on the values 
of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law 
and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging 
to minorities”. It is, thus, necessary that the relevant legal framework on 
the combat of fraud achieves a fair and proportionate balance between the 
4.  C. STEFANOU / S. WHITE / H. XANTHAKI, OLAF at the crossroads – action against 
EU fraud, Hart publishing, 2011.
5.  Regulations No 1073/1999 and No 1074/1999 of 25 May 1999 concerning investiga-
tions conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) define the Office’s main role 
and set the framework for OLAF’s administrative investigations, especially arts 9 and 10 
of Regulation No 1073/99.
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public interest of safeguarding the Union’s financial interests and the rights 
of the suspect who is accused of financial crime6.
Judicial access and the existence of effective legal means of judicial pro-
tection constitute the cornerstone of the right to effective judicial protec-
tion7. The present article aims to examine the possibilities of judicial pro-
tection enjoyed by the suspects who are investigated by OLAF8. The article 
will attempt to show that the Court’s case-law concerning the admissibil-
ity conditions for actions for annulment deprives in practice the applicant 
from effectively challenging any illegal activities of OLAF. The first part 
will deal with the remote possibility of an action for annulment (I), while 
the second part will demonstrate that the legal remedy of the action for 
damages can only tackle a minor part of OLAF’s activities, rendering its 
actions practically free from judicial control (II)9. The expectation of “a 
complete system of legal remedies and procedures”10 in the case of OLAF 
is proven to be particularly ambitious. The goal of this article is to shed 
some light in the lacuna of the judicial control of OLAF’s actions and to 
identify appropriate ways to ensure that the rights of the persons under 
investigation are being fully respected.
II. ACTION FOR ANNULMENT: A REMOTE POSSIBILITY TO CHALLENGE OLAF’S 
ACTIONS
a) The general jurisprudential framework
6.    M. RODOPOULOS in V. Christianos, TEU and TFEU, Interpretation by Article, ed. 
Nomiki Bibliothiki, 2012, p. 1292 [in Greek].
7.    Case C-50/00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council, 25.07.2002, ECR I-6677, 
paras 38-39. See further K. LENAERTS, The rule of law and the coherence of the judi-
cial system, CML Rev., 2007, p. 1625 et seq.
8.    The legal means of the administrative appeal – in the course of a purely administrative 
procedure – or the complaints to the European Ombudsman do not fall under the scope 
of the present study. It should, however, be noted that, in practice, a positive decision by 
the Ombudsman could prove to be much more efficacious than the judicial protection, 
because of the great political significance the Ombudsman’s decision bear. In this re-
spect, see A. TSADIRAS, The position of the European Ombudsman in the community 
system of judicial remedies, EL.Rev., 2007, pp. 607-626.
9.    EU officials must follow an administrative procedure before introducing an action in 
Court. See articles 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulation. See also K. LENAERTS / D. ART / I. 
MASELIS, Procedural Law of the European Union, Sweet & Maxwell, 2006, Chapter 4.
10.  Case C-294/83, Les Verts v. Parliament, 23.04.1986, ECR 1339, para. 23.
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Article 263 TFEU constitutes the legal basis of the Court’s competence to 
review the legality of acts by the European Union’s institutions. One major 
condition for the admissibility of the actions brought before the CJEU is 
that the act at issue produces legal results against third parties. It should, 
therefore, be enforceable and not merely a simple recommendation or 
opinion. The origins of the concept of the enforceable administrative act 
are found in the French theory and jurisprudence. Accordingly, a “décision 
faisant grief” (decision exécutoire) is defined as a decision that can be en-
forceable and is subject to judicial review11. Consequently, if the contested 
act is not enforceable, the relevant legal remedy will not even meet the 
admissibility requirement. 
Indeed, it is settled case-law that only measures with binding legal effects 
and capable of affecting the interests of the applicant, by bringing about 
a distinct change in his legal position, are acts or decisions which may 
be the subject of an action for annulment12. According to the same case-
law, regarding the admissibility of actions for annulment, it is necessary 
to look into the substance of the contested acts, as well as the intention of 
those who drafted them, in order to classify those acts. In that regard, it is 
in principle those measures that definitively determine the position of the 
Commission upon the conclusion of an administrative procedure and are 
intended to have legal effects capable of affecting the interests of the com-
plainant, which are open to challenge. In contrast, intermediate measures 
that serve as preparatory means towards the final decision, do not have 
those effects13. Consequently, any measure of a preparatory nature falls 
outside the scope of the judicial review provided for in article 263 TFEU.
b) OLAF’s acts as preparatory measures
OLAF’s investigations end with the production of a conclusion on the case 
at issue, which is embodied in the final report. It follows that if there is 
evidence that a criminal offence may have occurred in a Member State, 
OLAF forwards the data it has collected to the national authorities, so that 
11.  E. LAFERRIERE, Traité de la juridiction administrative et des recours contentieux, 
1896, t. 2, p. 427.
12.  Case C-117/91, Bosman v. Commission, 04.10.1991, ECR I-4837, para. 13; Case 
C-123/03 P, Commission v. Greencore, 09.12.2004, ECR I-11647, para 44; Case 60/81, 
IBM v. Commission, 11.11.1981, ECR-2639.
13.  Case C-521/06 P, Athinaiki Techniki v. Commission, 17.07.2008, ECR I-5829, para. 
42.
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they initiate the relevant procedures, in accordance with their national law, 
as provided in Art. 10(2) Reg. 1073/1999. At the same time, it forwards 
this data to the competent EU organization, so that it initiates the relevant 
disciplinary procedures. Thus, the question arising in this framework is, 
whether the final report drawn up by OLAF and OLAF’s forwarding of the 
final report prescribing an internal investigation to an EU institution or to 
the national prosecuting authorities constitute acts that are subject to an-
nulment according to Article 263 TFEU.  
The Court dealt with this issue for the first time in the Gomez-Reino case 
and, since then, it has been consistently rejecting applications for annul-
ment against these acts, by reason of that the contested acts do not bring 
about a distinct change in the applicant’s legal position14.
The act by which OLAF forwards the relevant information to national ju-
dicial authorities, in accordance with the obligation laid down in Article 
10(2) of Regulation No 1073/1999, represents a preparatory act which, 
in itself, does not change the legal position of the applicant. It is for the 
national judicial authorities alone to decide what it is to be done with the 
forwarded information and to decide, in accordance with their national 
law, whether or not to initiate a judicial inquiry, to carry out investigative 
measures and to commence criminal proceedings. Thereafter, the national 
court is competent to decide whether the person concerned is guilty or not. 
Consequently, both the findings of the final report as well as the forward-
ing information are considered by the Court as simple internal measures, 
unable to have any legal effect15.  
The Court, furthermore, considers that the duty of cooperation has no bind-
ing legal effect on the national legal authorities or the applicant. The duty 
of cooperation provides that the national judicial authorities only have 
to examine the forwarded information carefully in order to comply with 
Union’s law. The initiation of any further legal proceedings is left exclu-
sively to the wide discretionary power of the competent national authori-
ties. Νational judicial authorities remain free, in the context of their own 
powers, to assess the content and significance of that information and the 
actions to be taken, if necessary. Consequently, the possible initiation of 
14.  Case T-215/02, Gomez-Reino v. Commission, 18.12.2003, ECR-345, paras 50-56 and 
Case C-471/02 P, Gomez-Reino v. Commission, 08.04.2003, ECR I-3207.
15.  Case T-193/04, Tillack v. Commission, 04.10.2006, ECR II-3995, paras 66-70.
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legal proceedings following the forwarding of information by OLAF and 
the subsequent legal acts remain the national authorities’ sole and entire 
responsibility.
In the Tillack case, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the 
strict admissibility conditions, as interpreted in the case-law, deprive the 
applicant from the only effective means of judicial protection he has in 
his disposal when OLAF conducts illegal investigations. The Court ruled 
that “this argument is not, in itself, sufficient to justify the admissibility of 
an action”16. This ruling was premised on the idea that the effective legal 
protection should not be examined in a fragmented way, as if it was di-
rectly connected to one and only legal remedy, but, in contrast, it should be 
considered as the legal product of many complementary legal remedies in 
successive legal orders. 
Indeed, as the Court noted in the case at issue, the applicant brought an 
action before the Belgian courts and then before the European Court of Hu-
man Rights, against measures taken by the Belgian judicial authorities in 
response to the forwarding of information by OLAF17. As settled case-law 
demonstrates, however, while national courts do not have the power to an-
nul EU acts, the applicant has always the possibility to request the national 
courts to send a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice, 
which remains competent in that regard18. Finally, as it will be analysed 
under section (ΙΙ), even if the applicant does not have the possibility to 
ask for the annulment of the allegedly illegal act, he can – in the action for 
damages framework – ask for restitution for the damage he has suffered19. 
c) A critique on the general trend of inadmissibility
16.  Case T-247/04, Aseprofar and Edifa v. Commission, 19.09.2005, ECR II-3449, para 
59.
17.  Case T-193/04, Tillack v. Commission, 04.10.2006, ECR II-3995, para 80.
18.  National courts do not have the power to annul EU acts but even non last instance courts 
are obliged to send a reference for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU, which is the only 
competent Court to do so. See to that effect Case 314/85, Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt 
Lübeck-Ost, 22.10.1987, ECR 4199, para 20.
19.  Case T-215/02, Gómez Reino v. Commission, 18.12.2003, ECR FP-I-A-345, FP-II-
1685.
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The Court’s justification of its persistent denial to examine the acts and 
omissions of OLAF under the prism of Article 263 TFEU, has been heavily 
criticized in theory, for not being adequately convincing20.
First of all, it should be noted that the argument that neither the final report 
nor the forwarding of information by OLAF have a catalytic impact in 
the legal position of the applicant seems rather formalistic. Indeed, some 
investigative acts, to the extent that they undermine defence rights and 
procedural rights in general, such as the right of representation by a lawyer, 
the right to a prior hearing, the personal data protection etc., constitute sep-
arate, well established, rights in the Union’s rights’ protection regime and 
as such their deprival can be understood as deteriorating the applicant’s 
legal situation21. Furthermore, although the final report is not binding for 
the institutions it addresses, it can include assessments that undermine the 
honour, the reputation and the dignity of the listed persons. This moral 
damage is a real consequence in the legal world, which has a negative 
impact on the applicant’s legal situation, even if it is not accompanied by 
further judicial or disciplinary acts. In this case, the transformation of the 
legal interests is not a hypothetical or potential future transformation, but 
rather a direct transformation in the moral personality of the applicant, 
which is recognized as an independently protected legal right, without a 
need to establish further (potential) material damage.
Secondly, regarding the argument that the general system of legal protec-
tion, in its most comprehensive design, which includes European and in-
ternational legal orders, is sufficient and effective, it has to be noted that 
the CJEU held in the UPA judgment that the right to effective judicial pro-
tection is a general principle of law, common to the constitutional tradi-
tions of the Member States and enshrined in articles 6 and 13 ECHR22. As 
a consequence, the system of protection of the applicants’ rights has to 
20.  J. INGHERLAM, Judicial Review of investigative acts of the European anti-fraud of-
fice (OLAF): a search for a balance, CML Rev., 2012, pp. 601-628, 607; H.-J. PRIEB 
/ H. SPITZER in H. von der Groeben / J. Schwarze, Kommentar zum Vertrag über die 
EU, NOMOS, p. 1224; J. WAKEFIELD, annotation in Tillack, CML Rev., 2008, pp. 
199-221; W. HETZER, Fight against fraud and protection of fundamental rights in the 
European Union, European Journal of crime, criminal law and criminal justice, 2006, 
pp. 20-45.
21.  T-16/91, Rendo and Others v. Commission, 18.11.1992, ECR II-2417.
22.  Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Founda-
tion v. Council and Commission, 03.09.2008, ECR I-6351, para 335.
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be complete and effective in fact and not only in theory. The path of the 
reference for a preliminary ruling, which is suggested by the Court as a 
sufficient alternative, seems particularly uncertain and hypothetical. The 
national court has the obligation to send a reference for a preliminary rul-
ing only in cases where arises a question of interpretation of EU law or of 
validity of an EU act that will have a real impact in the adjudication of the 
case at issue in the national court. If the information supplied by OLAF 
has no binding legal effect and the prosecution takes place by the national 
authorities acting proprio motu, then any matter raised will be strictly a 
matter of national law, thus depriving the Court of Justice of any compe-
tence to interfere in the case.
In addition, it is completely uncertain whether in the end there will be a 
national judicial process that will allow examining issues of validity of 
OLAF’s acts, since, as the Court accepts, the forwarding of the OLAF re-
port to national authorities does not have a binding effect on their judicial 
discretion and, as a consequence, no further proceedings might be initi-
ated23. The result will be that the final report and the irregularities during 
the investigations remain in force, unable to be challenged incidentally in 
the framework of national judicial review, since it is likely that the latter 
will never be initiated. 
In the Violetti case, the General Court deviated from the settled case-law re-
garding the actions’ admissibility condition24. The case concerned OLAF’s 
investigation in the Joint Research Centre in Ispra, Italy, which is the Euro-
pean Commission’s in-house science service. 230 employees of this Centre 
were suffering from partial disability and, as such, they were receiving the 
relevant benefits, raising suspicions of fraud against the EU budget because 
of the unusually high percentage of disability. Although OLAF’s director 
forwarded the information obtained in the course of the internal investiga-
tion to the Public Prosecutor in Varese (Italy), in accordance with the first 
sentence of Article 10 (2) of Regulation No 1073/1999, the expert forensic 
23.  W. HETZER, National criminal prosecution and European tendering of evidence. 
Perspectives of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), European journal of crime, 
Criminal and criminal Justice, 2004, pp. 166-183.
24.  Case F-5/05 and F-7/05, Violetti and Others v. Comission, 28.04.2009, FP-I-A-1-83, 
FP-II-A-1-473. For a detailed casenote on Violetti see X. GROUSSOT / Z. POPOV, 
What’s wrong with OLAF? Accountability, due process and criminal justice in Euro-
pean anti-fraud policy, CML Rev., 2010, pp. 605-642.
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report concluded that the medical evidence was not sufficient to prove the 
existence of fraudulent accident reports. Consequently, after receiving an 
application to that effect from the Public Prosecutor in Varese, the judge in 
charge of preliminary investigations at the District Court in Varese decided 
to terminate the proceedings. As a result, by complaining that the final re-
port was neither reasoned in form nor well founded in substance and that it 
damaged their honour, the applicants did not have locus standi before the 
Italian courts that would allow them to request the annulment of OLAF’s 
harmful administrative act. 
After paying serious consideration to the aforementioned concerns, the Eu-
ropean Union Civil Service Tribunal ruled that decisions taken pursuant 
to the first sentence of Article 10(2) of Regulation No 1073/1999 should 
be awarded the status of an act adversely affecting an official, within the 
meaning of Article 90a of the Staff Regulations, taking into account that a 
decision to forward information, such as the decision at issue, has immedi-
ately negative effects on the interests, career and reputation of the persons 
concerned. However, on appeal, the General Court rejected the Civil Ser-
vice Tribunal’s argumentation, upholding the existing settled case-law25.
Third, as regards the alternative way of remedy through the action for dam-
ages, it should be observed that such an action certainly enables the suspect 
to obtain compensation for damage allegedly suffered by him on the occa-
sion of an OLAF investigation. However, as it will be demonstrated later in 
this paper, the possibility of remedy through such an action for damages is 
restricted, due to strict conditions and the fact that the burden of proof rests 
with the plaintiff. In contrast, in cases of moral damage, without the im-
plication of further material damage, the annulment of an act that has been 
challenged may, in itself, constitute appropriate and, in principle, sufficient 
reparation for any non-material harm the applicant may have suffered26.
Lastly, the approach that the EU courts adopt leaves in essence OLAF’s 
actions free from judicial control27. While OLAF is equipped with broad 
powers of investigation and control, it seems that its potential drift towards 
25.  Case T-261/09 P, Commission v. Violetti and Others, 20.05.2010, not yet published.
26.  Case T-136/03, Schochaert v. Council, 08.07.2004, FP-I-A-215, FP-II-957, para. 34.
27.  H. XANTHAKI, Fraud in the EU: Review of OLAF’s regulatory framework, in I. Ben-
tekas / G. Keramidas, International and European financial criminal law, Butterworths, 
2006, pp. 120-153.
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arbitrariness is not subject to judicial review and, as any power which is not 
subject to restrictions and controls, OLAF’s acts may constitute a threat to 
the peoples’ rights and freedoms. Consequently, even if the citizen, whose 
rights have been violated, achieves eventually remedy, either before na-
tional courts or in the framework of an action for damages, there will still 
remain a lacuna between the illegal act and the judicial control, as the latter 
will not have as a direct subject the relevant illegal act. If we add to this 
that, because of its hybrid nature, OLAF is represented before the courts 
by the Commission, it is highly unlikely that many decisions that proclaim 
its acts illegal will come to its knowledge28. 
As a result the case-law should take a turn in the aim of submitting the 
activities of that Office to effective judicial review. Such a turn could be 
effectuated by considering that the final report brings about changes in the 
legal rights of the person in case. Indeed, OLAF enjoys superior powers 
and its reports bear special gravity, which is not reflected accurately in the 
legal texts that undergo OLAF’s actions. This gap between the legal world 
and the reality has to be bridged by the EU Courts in a way that no power 
is exercised without respecting the EU citizens’ procedural rights.
d) The Planet case: The birth of a judicial shift?
The Planet case concerns the Early Warning System (EWR) for the use of 
authorising officers of the Commission and the executive agencies, which 
was adopted by the Commission Decision 2008/969/EC, Euratom on 16 
December 200829. The EWS’s purpose is to ensure, within the Commis-
sion and its executive agencies, the circulation of restricted information 
concerning third parties who could represent a threat to the Communities’ 
financial interests and reputation or to any other fund administered by the 
Communities. According to Article 10 of the Decision, under the title ‘W1 
warnings’, OLAF shall request the activation of a W1a warning where its 
investigations at an early stage give sufficient reason to believe that find-
ings of serious administrative errors or fraud are likely to be recorded in 
relation to third parties, especially those who are benefiting or have ben-
efited from Community funds.
28.  T-435/09 R, GL 2006 Europe v. Commission, 16.09.2010, ECR II-32, paras 13-16. See 
also J. INGHERLAM, Judicial Review of investigative acts of the European anti-fraud 
office (OLAF): a search for a balance, CML Rev., 2012, p. 603. 
29.  Case T-320/09, Planet v. Commission, 13.04.2011, ECR II-1673. 
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Planet is a Greek company, which provides advisory services in the field of 
the administration of companies and in 2007 was the subject of an inquiry 
carried out by OLAF because of suspected irregularities in Planet’s man-
agement of EU funds. The findings that emerged from OLAF’s investiga-
tion led it to request Planet’s registration in the EWS. As a result of Planet’s 
registration in the system, the company was notified that it was not allowed 
to sign a contract with the Commission, namely that the contract had been 
suspended until a further condition would be satisfied, i.e. the opening by 
Planet of a blocked bank account, through which it would have access only 
to the part of the advance payment which was due under the contract.
Following this development, Planet brought an application before the Gen-
eral Court for the annulment of OLAF’s decisions. The General Court re-
jected the Commission’s argument that Planet’s application was inadmis-
sible because of the nature of the contested measures, which were merely 
internal precautionary informative measures, unable to be the subject of a 
review of legality under Article 263 TFEU. The General Court concluded 
that the contested measures affected Planet’s room for negotiation and the 
organisation within the consortium of which it was part and, therefore, 
Planet’s ability to actually conclude the project that concerned the contract 
at issue. The General Court added that to refuse Planet the right to any ju-
dicial review would be incompatible with a European Union governed by 
the rule of law, particularly since Decision 2008/969 does not provide for 
any right for natural and legal persons to be informed or heard before they 
are registered in the EWS by the activation of the relevant warnings. The 
CJEU rejected the Commission’s appeal and upheld the General Court’s 
decision, pointing out that the contested measures could not be regarded 
as intermediate and preparatory measures not subject to review. Insofar as 
the registration of an entity on a warning list has further repercussions for 
the company, such as the imposition of additional burdens and conditions 
upon it, then the measures at issue concentrate the legal characteristics of 
reviewable measures30. 
The Court’s argumentation demonstrates a small but significant judicial 
shift in comparison to the previous settled case-law, which persistently ac-
cepted that the forwarding of information by OLAF to the national authori-
ties or other EU institutions was inadmissible. Indeed, in the Planet case 
30.  Case C-314/11 P, Commission v. Planet, 09.12.2012, not yet published, paras 48-60.
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the Court adopted a more pragmatic approach in relation to the repercus-
sions that the forwarding of OLAF’s ‘findings’ might have in the legal 
situation of the people under investigation. The Court, hence, refused to 
adhere to the Commission’s opinion that any deterioration of the plaintiff’s 
legal situation was a result of other institutions’ and authorities’ subsequent 
acts. On the contrary, it rightly acknowledged that the transmission of in-
formation is the causa efficiens, which triggers a domino effect that might 
deteriorate the plaintiff’s legal position. As such, the OLAF’s harmful act 
cannot remain immune to judicial control under the formalistic justification 
that it does not constitute a harmful act subject to an action for annulment 
according to Article 263 TFEU. The final report, the information forward-
ing and any harmful action that might follow are inextricably linked with 
each other, thus constituting an indivisible natural unit of acts. It follows 
that OLAF’s acts must be considered as acts that affect the legal situation 
of the plaintiff for the purpose of applying Article 263 TFEU. Future case-
law of the Court rests to show whether this ‘on the right track’ approach, 
that attaches to the right for effective judicial protection, will endure.
III. ACTION FOR DAMAGES: INSUFFICIENT SCOPE THAT LEADS TO ONLY PAR-
TIAL REMEDY FOR THE PLAINTIFF
a) Admissibility of the actions but poor results
The legal remedy of an action for the EU’s non-contractual liability might 
prove to be more effective for the applicant. Accordingly, the EU, follow-
ing the general principles common to the laws of the member states, shall 
make good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the 
performance of their duties. Even if the act that causes the damage can-
not be annulled, the action for damages still arises and can be pursued in 
any case31. Individuals who, by reason of the admissibility conditions laid 
down in Article 263 TFEU, cannot contest directly EU acts or measures, 
have, nonetheless, the opportunity to challenge the alleged wrongful acts 
of OLAF by bringing an action for non-contractual liability where its con-
duct is of such a nature as to entail liability for the EU32. In brief, the action 
31.  Case 4/69, Lütticke v. Commission, 28.04.1971, ECR 325.
32.  Joined Cases T-377/00, T-379/00, T-380/00, T-260/01 and T-272/01, Philip Morris In-
ternational and Others v. Commission, 15.01.2003, ECR II-1, para. 123. See also A. 
BIONDI / M. FARLEY, The right to damages in European Law, Kluwer Law Interna-
tional, 2009, p. 87. 
145HREL  2013against OLAF’S Acts
for damages remains independent of any action for annulment33. The rejec-
tion of the latter as inadmissible does not necessarily lead to a rejection of 
the former as inadmissible as such34. As a consequence, in the action for 
damages it remains open to individuals to challenge unlawful acts which 
have been committed during the drafting and adoption of an administrative 
report, even though that report is not a decision directly affecting the rights 
of the persons mentioned therein35.
However, even if the action for damages passes the admissibility test, in 
order for it to be successful, the conditions for the establishment of the rel-
evant claim should be met. According to settled case-law on the liability of 
the Community for damage caused to an individual by a breach of Union’s 
law for which an institution or organ is responsible, a right to reparation is 
conferred where three conditions are met: 
-  the rule of law infringed must be intended to confer rights on individu-
als; 
- the breach must be sufficiently serious and
-  there must be a direct causal link between the breach of the obligation 
resting on the author of the act and the damage sustained by the injured 
parties36.
33.  See Case C-234/02 P, Ombudsman v. Lamberts, 23.03.2004, ECR I-2803, para. 59, 
where it is stated that action for damages “is an independent form of action, with a par-
ticular function to fulfil within the system of legal remedies and subject to conditions for 
its use conceived with a view to its specific purpose”. Although actions for annulment 
and for failure to act seek a declaration that a legally binding measure is unlawful or that 
such a measure has not been taken, an action to establish liability seeks compensation 
for damage resulting from a measure or from unlawful conduct, attributable to a Com-
munity institution or body. See Case C-234/02 P, Médiateur v. Lamberts, para. 59.
34.  Following this reasoning, it is suggested in theory that the possibility of taking interim 
measures in the framework of actions for damages arises. According to this interesting 
view, interim relief by way of suspension of the operation of a measure, ordered in the 
framework of an action for damages, does not seem entirely impossible, considering that 
the suspension of the contested act prevents future damage which might be serious and 
impairable. See J. INGHERLAM, Judicial Review of investigative acts of the European 
anti-fraud office (OLAF): a search for a balance, CML Rev., 2012, pp. 619-620.
35.  Case C-315/99 P, Ismeri Europa v. Court of Auditors, 10.07.2001, ECR I-5281, paras 29 
and 30. See further P. CRAIG, EU Administrative Law, 2009, Oxford, pp. 765-766.
36.  Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du pêcheur and Factortame, 05.03.1996, 
ECR I-1029, para. 51; Case C-352/98 P, Bergaderm and Goupil v. Commis-
sion, 04.07.2000, ECR I-5291, paras 41 and 42.
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Starting from the premise that the plaintiff has the burden of proof of all 
the aforementioned conditions37 and taking into account that the Court 
interprets relatively narrowly these conditions38, it should not come as a 
surprise that, in the very few cases this legal remedy has been successful, 
the compensations that have been awarded were so small, that stray very 
far from being considered as satisfactory39. Based on the argument that the 
damage is caused by other authorities’ subsequent acts and not by OLAF, 
OLAF remains most of the times in the ‘legal underground’ since its illegal 
acts are not most of the times a direct causa of the damage incurred. 
b) Directly and individually concerned
The first condition for the establishment of non-contractual liability of 
Member States provides that the violated rule must confer rights to natural 
or legal persons. The fact that the violated rule has been laid out for the 
protection of some general and not necessarily individual interest does not 
preclude the possibility that the rule has been established for the protec-
tion of natural persons’ rights in the context of an action for damages40. 
For instance, the Court ruled in the Camos Grau case that the obligation 
of impartiality constitutes such a rule. More specifically, in the case at is-
sue, Camos Grau, the person under investigation, drew attention to the fact 
that one of OLAF’s investigators did not possess the objectivity needed 
for carrying out the investigation. Although OLAF decided to remove this 
person from the investigation, the actions in which the investigator had 
been involved were left intact. The violation of the obligation of objectiv-
ity led finally to the award of damages to the applicant for non-material 
damage41.
In general, the fundamental rights of protection of family life, press free-
dom, the principle of the presumption of innocence and the right to a fair 
trial, confer rights upon individuals, enforced by the Union’s Courts. In 
brief, all the procedural guarantees included in Regulation 1073/1999 or 
37.  Case T-48/05, Franchet and Byk v. Commission, 08.07.2008, ECR II-1585, paras 182 
and 397.
38.  G. ANAGNOSTARAS, Not as unproblematic as you might think: the establishment of 
causation in governmental liability actions, EL.Rev., 2002, p. 663 et seq.
39.  Compensations vary between EURO 3.000 and 56.000.
40.  Joined Cases C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94, C-189/94 C-190/94, Dillenkofer and Oth-
ers v. Federal republic Germany, 08.10.1996, ECR I-4845, paras 36-38.
41.  Case T-309/03, Camos Grau v. Commission, 06.04. 2006, ECR II-1173, paras 46-51.
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the rights provided in the ΕU Charter of Fundamental Rights, such as the 
right of information, the right to be heard, the right to be assisted by a per-
son of one’s choice at an interview and the right not to incriminate oneself 
are generally considered to confer rights on individuals for the purposes of 
Article 340 TFEU42.
The cases of ‘acts of maladministration’ remain more complex, in par-
ticular if the Ombudsman has previously ruled on the matter within the 
limits of its own jurisdiction43. Ιn that regard, it has been adjudicated that 
an alleged breach of the principle of sound administration does not in itself 
confer rights upon individuals44. This happens because the Treaty, via the 
Ombudsman, has provided to EU citizens, and more particularly officials 
and other servants of the EU, an alternative remedy to that of an action be-
fore the Union’s Courts in order to protect their interests. That alternative 
non-judicial remedy meets specific criteria and does not necessarily have 
the same objective as judicial proceedings45. However, it is not unlikely 
that the violation of the principle of sound administration entails simul-
taneously a violation of a more special right, which is the ultimate right 
upon which the individual can base his claims for damages. In other words, 
the infringement of the principle of sound administration does not confer 
rights upon individuals, except where it constitutes the expression of spe-
cific rights, such as the right to have their affairs handled impartially, fairly 
and within a reasonable time, the right to be heard, the right to have access 
to files or the obligation to give reasons for decisions, for the purposes of 
Article 41 of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union. The 
case of information leakage is a conduct which is not only incompatible 
with the principle of sound administration but also violates the right of the 
applicant to protect her personal data according to Article 16 TFEU and the 
relevant secondary legislation46. 
42.  Case C-555/07, Kukukdeveci, 19.01.2010, paras 21-22. See W. HETZER, Fight against 
fraud and protection of fundamental rights in the European Union, European Journal of 
Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 2006, pp. 20-45.
43.  G. KRATSAS, A case for OLAF: The place and role of the Anti-Fraud Office in the 
European Union context, EPL, 2012, pp. 65-97.
44.  Case T-196/99, Area Cova and Others v. Council and Commission, 06.12.2001, ECR 
II-3597, para. 43.
45.  Case T-209/00, Lamberts v. Ombudsman, 10.04.2002, ECR II-2203, para. 65.
46.  T-259/03, Nikolaou v. Commission, 12.09.2007, ECR II-99, paras 193-200. See also 
Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
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c) Sufficiently serious breach
With regard to the requirement that the breach must be sufficiently seri-
ous, the decisive test for determining whether that requirement is met is 
whether the institution concerned has manifestly and gravely disregarded 
the limits of its discretion. Where that institution has only a considerably 
reduced or even no discretion, the mere infringement of Union’s law may 
be sufficient to establish the existence of a sufficiently serious breach47. As 
such, the decisive criterion is whether the deciding institution/organization 
is endowed with discretionary powers. No problem arises in cases where 
an explicitly protected/established right is violated, as the Union does not 
have any discretion regarding the respect or violation of these rights48. 
However, the press releases of OLAF raise a more problematic issue. In 
this framework, the two conflicting rights are the OLAF’s “right to com-
municate” against the individual’s procedural rights. On the one hand, the 
Court in Giraudy recognized “that a culture of accountability has grown 
up within the Community institutions, responding in particular to the con-
cern of the public to be informed and assured that malfunctions and frauds 
are identified and, as appropriate, duly eliminated and punished. The con-
sequence of that requirement is that officials and other servants who hold 
posts of responsibility within an administration such as the Commission 
must take into account the possible existence of a justified need to com-
municate a degree of information to the public”49. Accordingly, a fair and 
proportionate balance has to be struck between the public’s legitimate in-
terest in access to information and to the procedural rights of the person 
under investigation. 
personal data and on the free movement of such data, 24.10.1995 and Regulation No 
45/2001, 18.12.2001, on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and of the free movement of 
such data.
47.  Case C-312/00 P, Commission v. Camar and Tico, 10.12.2002, ECR I-11355, para. 54 
and Joined Cases T-198/95, T-171/96, T-230/97, T-174/98 and T-225/99, Comafrica and 
Dole Fresh Fruit Europe v. Commission, 12.07.2001, ECR II-1975, para. 134.
48.  A. BIONDI / M.FARLEY, The right to damages, 2009, Kluwer Law International, pp. 
48-53.
49.  Case F-23/05, Giraudy v. Commission, 02.05.2007, FP-I-A-1-121, FP-II-A-1-657, para. 
165. According to the European Commission (European Governance: A white paper, 
COM 2001(428) final, accountability is seen as a principle that obligates the EU institu-
tions to explain and take responsibility for what they do in Europe.
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Consequently, in view of the autonomy granted to OLAF by Regulation 
1073/1999 and by virtue of the general objective of press releases, i.e. 
providing information to the public, OLAF enjoys discretion as regards 
the appropriateness and content of its press releases in respect of its inves-
tigatory activities. If, nevertheless, in the relevant press release the person 
under investigation is explicitly mentioned as “liable” or “guilty”, there 
is a manifest transgression of OLAF’s discretionary powers, as the latter 
violates the presumption of innocence as stipulated under Article 6 (2) of 
the ECHR and, thus, the condition of the “manifest and grave disregard of 
the limits of one’s discretion” should be considered as fulfilled50. 
d) Direct causal link
In relation to the condition concerning the causal link, the EU may be held 
responsible only for a damage which constitutes a sufficiently direct conse-
quence of the misconduct of the institution concerned. By contrast, compen-
sation for every harmful consequence caused by the conduct of its bodies, 
let alone a remote one, does not lie within the responsibility of the EU51. 
Establishing a causal link between OLAF’s illegal acts and the damage of 
the investigated person remains complicated52. As it has already been men-
tioned, OLAF’s findings do not constitute binding guidelines towards the 
national authorities or the EU’s institutions they address. 
As a result, any damage incurred is considered to have been caused from 
the competent national authorities. Indeed, the sovereign and discretionary 
acts of the intervening national authorities break any causal link since they 
constitute the only direct and determining cause of the damage claimed53. 
The strict jurisprudential approach in relation to the condition of the causal 
link may lead, under certain circumstances, to particularly unjust results. 
The Nikolaou case is demonstrative of such unfairness. The Court, in this 
case, after shifting the burden of proof to the Commission, concluded that 
50.  Case T-48/05, Franchet and Byk II v. Commission, 08.07.2008, ECR II-1585, paras 
208-209.
51.  Joined cases 64-76 and 113-76, 167-78 and 239-78, 27-79, 28-79 and 45-79, Dumor-
tier v. Council, 04.10.1979, ECR 3091, para. 21 and Case T-333/01, Meyer v. Commis-
sion, 13.02.2003, ECR II-117, para. 32.
52.  A.G. TOTH, The concepts of damage and casualty as elements of non-contractual li-
ability, in T. Heukels / A. McDonnell, The action for damages in Community Law, 
1997, Kluwer Law International, p. 71 et seq.
53.  Case T-193/04, Tillack v. Commission, 04.10.2006, ECR II-3995, para. 110.
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the Commission was responsible for the information leakage and that 
OLAF was responsible only for an insignificant part of the total damage of 
the applicant. The Court considered, thus, that the material and moral dam-
age the applicant suffered was not caused by OLAF itself but rather by the 
press and journalists’ broadcasts that contained derogatory characteriza-
tions. It failed, however, to recognize that the starting point of the damage 
was the initial leakage to the press by OLAF, an act that, in the Court’s 
view, brought about only an insignificant damage to the applicant. As such, 
from the Euro 900.000 compensation that was requested by the applicant, 
only Euro 3.000 was awarded by the Court54.
This analysis demonstrates that as long as the influence of the de lege power 
of OLAF’s actions in the legal position of the applicants is not recognized, 
the results in case of an action for damages will be minimal. Any caused 
damage will be most of the times an “effet cumulatif”, which will be at-
tributed to an illegal act’s spillover. In other words, while OLAF’s illegal 
act is the one that activates the causal link chain so that the final damage 
is induced, the interference or interposition of a series of other factors and 
causes leads, thereby, to the inability to spot the direct source that causes 
the damage. Consequently, although the action for damages constitutes in 
theory one of the legal remedies in the toolbox of the applicant, it has been 
proven to be hardly efficient and effective in practice; contributing, thus, to 
the fact that OLAF’s illegal acts, one way or another, are not finally subject 
to any effective judicial protection. 
ΙV. CONCLUSIONS
The preceding analysis demonstrated how the challenge of OLAF’s al-
leged unlawful acts is not subject to the broad spectrum of the “available” 
remedial choices, but rather remains confined to the residual choice of the 
action for damages. 
The action for damages does not function as a last resort remedy, but rather 
as the ‘only resort’ remedy. Taking into account the high proof hurdles 
this legal remedy entails, both on grounds of establishing a “sufficiently 
serious breach” and a causal link, the action for damages is far from being 
characterized as an effective legal remedy. Indeed, the CJEU’s denial to 
acknowledge that OLAF’s final report and the forwarding of the informa-
54.  Case T-259/03, Nikolaou v. Commission, 12.09. 2007, ECR II-99, paras 301-325.
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tion to the national authorities constitute the triggering effect that is liable 
for bringing a distinct change in the legal position of the applicant, not 
only has deprived the applicant of his procedural rights, but has also left 
him without the possibility to annul OLAF’s acts that damage his honour 
and dignity. While effective judicial protection implies that the parties are 
given a genuine opportunity to raise their claim before a Court, the high 
standards of admissibility in the action of annulment should be perceived 
as infringing this general principle of EU Law. 
Having realized this problem, the CJEU adopted in the Planet case a more 
functional approach with regard to the admissibility requirements. The 
present article recommends that in its future case-law the CJEU should 
consolidate this looming shift, so that the applicants start enjoying an ef-
fective judicial protection of their rights. 
On the other hand, on the level of the managerial administrative structure 
of the Union’s services, although the need to combat fraud directed against 
the interests of the Union is undeniable, the invocation of the aforesaid pur-
pose by no means grants OLAF the right to act without restrain. Starting 
from the premise that the EU is a Union of laws, a union of rules that can-
not tolerate any elements of arbitrariness within its operations55, OLAF’s 
extensive powers of investigation as well as the wide latitude conferred to 
it by the law should fall under full judicial control56. 
De lege ferenda it would be desirable that OLAF becomes a part of the Eu-
ropean Public Prosecutor’s Office as stipulated under Article 86 TFEU57. 
The potential of OLAF becoming the “bras armé” of EPL would consoli-
date the democratic legitimization in the actions of the supervisory authori-
ties of the Commission and would render transparent the limits of action of 
the EU prosecuting authorities58. 
55.  V. CHRISTIANOS, Transparency, fundamental rights and OLAF’s notification system, 
Europeon politeia, 2010, p. 507-520 (in Greek).
56.  Special Report of The European Court of Auditors, 2/2011, Follow-up of special report 
1/2005, concerning the management of the European Anti-Fraud Office, paras 38-39.
57.  C. STEFANOU / S. WHITE / H. XANTHAKI, OLAF at the Crossroads – action against 
EU fraud, European Journal of Law and Economics, 2012, p. 201; M. RODODOULOS, 
op.cit., p. 1293.
58.  J. INGHELRAM, Legal and institutional aspects of the European Public Anti-Fraud 
Office, 2011, Europa Law Publishing; V. MITSILEGAS, EU Criminal Law, 2009, Hart 
Publishing, p. 218.
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Another solution would be that OLAF remains a specialized body dealing 
in its entirety with cases of administrative offences. Such a solution would 
presuppose a sharp distinction between cases that investigate criminal of-
fences and administrative irregularities. The former should be exclusively 
investigated under the guidance of EPL. In contrast, for the latter, OLAF 
could potentially remain competent for their investigation − equipped even 
with the power of imposing direct sanctions such as administrative fines − 
in an analogous way to what happens within the Regulation 1/2003 regime 
in the anti-trust field of law59. This way, OLAF would stop being an author-
ity with the mere purpose of forwarding information and would take over 
the investigations, thus being subject to the relevant judicial control. The 
‘acquis communautaire’ relating to the judicial control in the antitrust area 
will be particularly useful for the guarantee of the procedural rights of the 
persons under investigation. In any case, any legislative or judicial solu-
tions put forward to mitigate OLAF’s powers should have clear dedication 
to the fact that the EU is a Union of principles, institutions and rules that 
attributes to its citizens broad control powers of the supranational power 
structures60. 
59.  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of 
the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. See W. WILS, 
Powers of investigation and procedural rights and guarantees in EU antitrust enforce-
ment: The interplay between European and national legislation and case law, World 
Competition, 2006, pp. 3-24; L. GARZANITI / J. GUDOFSKY / J. MOFFAT, Dawn of 
a new era? Powers of investigation and enforcement under regulation 2003, Antitrust 
Law Journal, 2004, p. 159.
60.  S. GLESS / H. ZEITLER, Fair trial rights and the European Community’s fight against 
fraud, ELJ, 2001, pp. 219-237.
